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In the Supreme ··court
of the State of· Utah
HILDA A. BRIMM,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.
CACHE VALLEY BANKING CO.
a corporation, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF ANDREW
ANDERSEN, AKA, ANDREW
ANDERSON, Deceased.
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 7979
RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF

Respondent agrees with appellant that this is a
quiet title action.

The facts are not in dispute, or at

least there is very little dispute as to what the facts
are, but there is considerable dispute between these
parties as to the interpretation and m'eaning to be aplied to them, legally. And, except for a few ommissions,
appellant's Statement of Facts, are fairly acurate. Respondent will supply such omissions during the course
of her argument rather than to make an additional or
supplemental statement of facts, believing this will be in
the interest of clarity as well as to shorten this brief.
While appellant did object to the introduction of some
of the evidence--the use to which the waters emant-
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ing from the springs have always been put to-it is be.
lieved that there is not and could not be any dispute
as to these facts themselves.

Respondent will answer

appellant's argument, point by point in the order in
which presented.
ARGUMENT
Point No. 1: The lower court plainly did not err
in finding and holding that the 112 shares of stock in
the Mendon Central Irrigation Co., a corporation, is
appurtenant to the lands described in the complaint.
Appellant argues at pages 8 to 10 of its brief that
because the early water users formed a corporation
in 1917-1918, the Mendon Central Irrigation Co., and in
exchange for the conveyance by them of their respective
rights to the use of the waters emanating from certain
springs they each received a certain number of shares
of stock issued by the newly formed corporation which
entitled each of them to a like amount of water (the
same as they each formerly had), that therefore, ipso
facto, the certificates of stock and the water represented
thereby became personal property, the water was sever·
ed from the land, that the water represented thereby
could not be, remain or become appurtenant to any lands
unless the certificate of stock itself was specifically
transferred, and then cites and relies upon George vs.
Robison, et al, 63 Pac. 819 (Utah) (1901) and also refers
and quotes from Sec. 73-1-1 UCA, 1953 in support.
Appellant then concludes that the Deed of Water Right8,
Defs. Ex. 1, severed the water from the land, and then
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3
ask::-; "'what proof has plaintiff produced to show that
she is the owner of this water right'" and then answering the question thus asked asserts, ''Absolutely none.''
This therefore involves a question of both facts and
applicable law.

First as to the fact, ''what proof has

plaintiff produced to show that she is the owner of this
water right'"
Here is the proof! On ~::t:arch 18, 1895, Andrew
Andersen and his wife, Sofia Anderson, conveyed the
17.63 acre tract to James Quayle and Joseph E. Cowley,
and .Andrew Andersen never thereafter acquired title
to this tract for on May 28, 1896, Quayle and Cowley
conveyed to said Sophia Andersen. Certainly under
all law this conveyance carried with it the water right
and if so, then it must follow that a re-conveyance gave
the water right to Sophia Andersen. This same tract
was also conveyed to her a little over a month previous,
on April 7, 1896, by the Mayor of Mendon City with
appurtenances. (Abst. 8-10). The Articles of Incorporation of Mendon Irrigation Co. are dated Feb. 9, 1918,
bears the signature of Andrew Andersen (not that of
Sophia Andersen, the wife, who at that time undoubtedly under all law was the owner of the water as a
part of the real estate) as one of the incorporators.
Article 6 provides : ''That the purpose for which this
corporation is formed, and the pursuit and business
agreed upon, is to engage exclusively in furnishing water
to and for lands owned by the stockholders thereof, etc.''
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Defs. Ex. 2). Defs. Ex. 1, Deed of Water Rights, was

signed

~larch

9, 1918, and was joined in by Sophia

Andersen, wife of one of the ''incorporators,'' her
husband Andrew Andersen.

Querry, if any stock thus

issued to an ''incorporator'' who was not then the owner of any lands to be irrigated from the waters emanating from the spring waters became anything more than
the holder of a certificate of stock as a trustee for the
land owner? But be this as it may, at this time and
always since the lands were irrigated without interruption from the waters which emanated from the springs
referred to in the exhibits and in appellant's brief,
page 5. On July 23, 1918, Andrew Andersen conveyed
the 2.50 acre tract to his wife, Sophia Andersen. ( Abs.
19).
Andrew Andersen died July 19, 1922, at Mendon.
On January 25, 1924, Sophia L. Andersen, his widow,
conveyed the said tracts to L. M. Andersen, her son,
who was a bachelor. (Abst. 15) L. M. Andersen died
November 18, 1947, and on May 24, 1948, Decree of
Final Distribution was entered in his estate by the
terms of which, in addition to other property, an undivided 6 7/72 interest in the said two tracts of land
was distributed to Catherine S. Gibbons. (Abst. 20-2fl).
And on July 7 and July 26, 1948, by separate deeds
Raymond Andersen, et. al., and Mrs. Farrell Thomas
conveyed their interests in said tracts to CathPrinl' S.
Gibbons (Abst. 26-27). By this time she had acquired
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an ~ 19ths interest in the property. On January 25, 1949,
Catherine S. Gibbons, conveyed her undivided 8/9ths
interest in said tracts to Hilda A. Brimm, formerly
Hilda ..:\. Leonard, a niece b~, relation and a sister by
adoption to Catherine S. Gibbons and L. M.. Andersen,
deceased. On June 22, 1949, this plaintiff, Hilda A.
Brim1n, acquired the rmnaining outstanding 1/9th interest in said tracts of land for a consideration of
$2,000.00 from her uncle by relation and brother by adoption, John C. Andersen, who is one of the petitioners
herein for letters of administration on the estate of
Andrew ~lndersen, deceased, his deceased father. (Abst.
29) Hilda A. Leonard had previously conveyed her interest as an heir of L. ~I. Andersen to Catherine S.
Gibbons. ( Abst. 20) By Decree of District Court of
Cache County dated Sept. 11, 1950, affirmed by this
court in 230 Pac. 2nd 983, Hilda A. Brimm, plaintiff
herein, was adjudged to be the owner of said two tracts
of land (and other land) burdened to support Catherine
S. Gibbons, a daughter of Andrew Andersen, deceased,
The heirs of L. M. Andersen and Andrew Andersen
are the same. (Tr. 41) Both tracts of land have always been watered from water out of Mendon Central Irrigation Company canals and ditches. (Tr. 28-23) Land is
worth little without water. (Tr. 34-36). Water covered by
certificate of stock and that used to irrigate is the sanw
water. (Tr. 36) All assessments which called for labor
have been paid or worked out (Tr. 45-47-49) Never
any interference with the right to use water until last

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
summer. (1951) (Tr. 49-50)

It will be observed also

that many of the conveyances referred to include appurtenant water rights belonging to the land conveyed
(abst. 22,26,27,28) and that the persons making these
conveyances are also heirs of Andrew Andersen, Deceased. It would seem from this, reasonably, that everybody considered the water as appurtenant to the lands
upon which the water has always been used. There
is certainly no evidence anywhere in the record of a
contrary intention.
Having thus answered appellant's question as to
"what proof plaintiff produced to show that she is the
owner of the water right'', it may now be appropriate
to ask what proof has appellant, except the stub of the
stock ledger which simply shows delivery of the certificate of stock to Andrew Andersen if this constitutes
any probative value at all at this late date, on April
30, 1918 to the right to the use of the water in question,
and also, further, upon what equitable principles
can appellant claim ownership?
Appellant does
not even have p o s s e s s i o n of the certificate
itself. Nor offer any explanation as to where it is,
except that they do not know. For ought they know
Andrew Andersen may have endorsed and delivered it
in his lifetime to his wife, and such an assumption is
much more in keeping with reason than it would be to
conclude that he intended his wife to have the ownership of the lands but without the water and without
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which they are of little use and value. An assumption
of endorse1nent and delivery, it seen1s to the writer, is
much more in keeping with reasonableness on the part
of Andrew Andersen, deceased, than it would be to pre~tune, as appellant does on page 11 of brief, that no
water right was mentioned in the· conveyance from
Sophia Andersen to her son, L. M. Andersen, because
they no doubt knew the water right could not be
transferred by deed, and that the ownership of water
was then vested in the estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased. Certainly if this was the case a probate would
not have been delayed for a period of thirty years.
It is submitted everybody always considered the water
part of the land, some of them adverting to putting
such references in the conveyances and some simply
overlooking the fact, which made no difference legally
so far as the water being appurtenant is concerned.
So much then for what might be inferred from the fact
that plaintiff does not have possession of the certificate,
and for the fact that appellant who claims to be the
owner thereof knows nothing about what deceased did
with it-if this sort of inference legally has anything
to do with right to use of water-under the facts and
circumstances in the case at bar. If it does, then the
fact remain that appellant who claims to be the owner
of the water does not have the certificate nor explain
where it is, nor do they show that they ever used the
water or even ever paid an assessment. All appellant
says is that we want the water.
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And at pages 10-12 of brief appellant says the deed
given (Defs. Ex. 1) completely severed the water froin
the land, that the water could then be used in whole or
in part upon other lands, and that the certificate and
water represented thereby became and forever remained
personal property, unless the certificate is delivered to
the owner of the land. Of course, the water could be
used upon any lands served by the canal company's
ditches, etc. There is no quarrel with this statement.
But the fact remains that this water never was used
upon any lands other than the two tracts of land.
This is not even disputed. And at page 12 of brief
appellant quotes rather copiously from George vs. Robinson, 63 Pac. 819. (Utah) (1901). The question in
this case was simply whether or not there was a breach
of warranty because there was no water with the land.
A cursory reading of the record in the case at bar
discloses a vast difference with respect to the use of
water, payment of assessments, etc., with the facts in
the Robinson case, supra. Then too in the Robinson
case at page 819, right hand column, it says, ''Were,
then, the water rights in fact appurtenant to the land~
If they were, the absence of any mention of them
in the deed is immaterial; but, if not, the warranty does
not include them. To determine the question thus
presented reference must be had to the evidence dehors
the instrument of record".
The facts above produced shows without contradic-
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tion that the water has
our decisions water

i~

alway~

been appt1rtenant. Under

'"appurtenant" if water is used

in direct connection with the real estate conveyed.
Thmnpson vs.

~Ir l(inney

63 Pac. 2d. 1056.

Enough

has then been here said to show that the facts in the
case at bar and the Robinson case are not even analagous. But even so, the George vs. Robinson case, supra,
has been overruled by this court in, In re Johnson's
Estate, 22S Pac. 7-±8, (Utah) (1924), where, at page
751, bottom of right hand coluinn referring to the Robinson case this court had the following to say:
"It is true that the decision is based largely
upon the argument that the shares of stock representing the water rights in quesion were personal property and therefore not capable of being
appurtenant to real estate. This is the general
rule with respect to shares of stock in ordinary
corporations, organized for pecuniary gain. But
we think the rule is not absolute, and should not
apply to shares of stock in an irrigation company
which is not organized for profit but for the
convenience of owners of water rights in the
regulation and distribution of the water to which
they are entitled. This distinction was not considered in the opinion of the court and there
were other controlling factors in the case, for
which reason the general rule there expressed
should be modified, when applied to a case like
the one at bar."
It is plain, therefore, whether or not water represented by certificates of stock is appurtenant to lands
is a rebuttable presumption, and not a conclusive one
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as appellant contends, and that -the proof in the case
at bar conclusively rebuts any contrary presumption
which might be indulged springing from a mere delivery
of a stock certificate to Andrew Andersen, now deceased, more than thirty-three years prior to the date
of trial. But appellant will probably argue that in re
Johnson's Estate, supra, is a will case and so not in
point. But a reading of the case will clearly show that
this can make no difference so far as the holding here
relied upon is concerned. Also, other cases decided
by our court have dealt and shows clearly the trend
and holding of our court on the question here presented. In Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 72 Pac. 2d. 630,
(Utah) (1937) at page 635, note 5, after citing cases
where the fact of appurtenancy was also questioned, the
court said:
''The defendant argues that the water in the
canal is personal property and so could not become appurtenant to the lands on which it was
used and cites, etc. . We do not deem it necessary to determine whether the corpus of the
water in the city's canal is personalty or realty.
We are not here dealing with water as personal
property but with the right to the use of water
created and bestowed by the exchange agreement for the benefit of certain lands. This
involves a right to the flow of water in and
from the city's canal to be used upon said
lands. Such a right is treated as an incorporeal
hereditament as distinguished from the corpus
of the water, and is real property.''
Appellant next quotes extensively frmn Oppenlander
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Left-Hand Ditch Co., 31 Pac. 85-! (Colo.) and states

that the decision of this court in George vs. Robinson,
supra, is supported by that case.

George vs. Robinson

was decided by our court in 1901 and the Oppenlander
case

wa~

decided in 1892, nine years· earlier, and the

Robinson case does not even mention it. The Oppenlander case is unimportant for at least two reasons:
First, the facts are entirely different. There the stock
was sold, but even so the question of the water being
appurtenant, if it could have been shown, was left open;
Therefore, upon examination, the case contains no
points of analogy, but many points of difference from
the facts in the case at bar; and second, our court has
decided in the question contrary in In re Johnson's
Estate, supra.
Now as to appellant's other claim, the water was
severed from the land~ Certainly to say it was severed,
does not make it severed. There is no evidence in the
record of severance so far as usage of the water is
concerned because it is undisputed that for more than
fifty years (Abst. 2) the water has without interruption
been used upon the lands in question. As stated
the Articles of Incorporation were signed February
6, 1918. The purpose and business agreed upon
was as stated in Article 6, ''is to engage exclusively in
furnishing water to and for lands owned by the stockholders thereof''. Andrew Andersen was not even then
a landowner. Article 5 provides for the issuance of a
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lilnit of 1350 shares of stock of different classes and
kinds which were to be issued in exchange of certain
spring water rights. Article 7-A again provides that
the rights and privileges are based upon the respective
prior rights of the stockholders in and to the use of
the waters arising from the mentioned springs. Article
7-B provides that the assessments shall be limited to repairs and maintenance of ditches necessary for the distribution of waters to the holders of stock. Article 8
provides that dividends shall only consist of the distribution of such water to each of the stockholders as
he is entitled to, and not otherwise. By Article 19 each
signer of the Articles represented that he is the owner
of a vested primary right to the use of the waters offered in exchange for stock to be issued to him. It is submitted that Andrew Andersen was not at this time the
owner of any primary right because he did not have title
to the land to which the water was then undeniably
appurtenant and a part of. It was realty and the water
has never been severed therefrom by any act or deed
of Sophia Andersen. The Articles clearly show that
the Mendon Central Irrigation Co. is nothing more nor
less than a mutual irrigation company, not organized
for profit, but for the convenience of its members in the
management of the irrigation system and in the distribution to them of water for use upon their lands in proportion to their respective interests, and that ownership
of shares of stock in the corporation is but incidental
to ownership of the water right.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
l:(

~
~

Appellant at page 14 of brief,

state~,

''If there

could be an~· doubt whether a water right represented
b~· shares of stock in a co1·po1·ation, is apptlrtenant to
the land upon which it i~ used, such doubt was rmnoved
by the Legislature when it mnended Section 100-1-10,
U. C. A .,1943, Session Laws 1943, page 154, which 1s
now 73-1-10, U. C. A. 1953, and then quotes:
''\Vater rights shall be transferred by deed
in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of
stock in a corporation, in which case water shall
not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land.''
It is believed that counsel for appellant construes
the above words which I have underlined to be a conclusive presumption and that in this he is in error.
As previously pointed out, respondent takes the position
that the language underlined constitutes a rebuttable
presumption at most and that this has been abundantly
met by the evidence produced. Also, it is in keeping
with the decisions in George vs. Robinson, supra, that
evidence of appurtenancy may be proven by proof
dehors the instrument, and the decision in In re Johnson's Estate, supra. And following said Section 73-1-10
is also cited the case of East River Bottom Water Co.
vs. Boyce, 128, Pac. 2d 277, decided by this court July
23, 1942, wherein it is stated:

"Where Articles of agreement of water company set forth object of company to be the controlling, managing, and distribution of certain
water of a certain river, it was held that such
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
limited and restrictive words did not constitute
a conveyance separating a water right appurtenant to land from the land, and did not vest the
title or right of use in the corporation within
the provisions of this section''.
It is respondent's position that the purposes as contained in the Articles of Incorporation of Mendon
Central Irrigation Co. comes within the holding of this
case and that because thereof the "Deed of Water
Rights'' did not, therefore, ipso facto, constitute a severence. 56 A. J. Waters, Sees. 243, 254. See also Yellowstone Valley Co. vs. Associated Mortgages Investors, 290 Pac. 255, (Mont.), 70 A. L. R. 1002. Adamson
vs. Brockbank (Utah) 185 Pac. 2d 264. In this last
case our court also refers to Sec. 78-1-11, U. C. A. 1943,
which provides that a deed in statutory form includes
appurtenances therewith, and then:
''If a deed by statute has the effect of passing all appurtenances to the property, then it
is not varying the terms of a written instrument
to establish what was appurtenant to the property. To hold to the contrary would render the
quoted statute nugatory.''
The court then held in this, the Adamson vs. Brockbank case, that by reason of the implied easement that
plaintiff should prevail, that the ditch is an appurtenance reasonably necessary to the use of the land for the
purposes for which it was bought, in line with the visible objects (ditch) and the intended use of the land
for farming purposes. By analogy, in the case at bar
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certainly upon each transfer of the land by . deed, the
ditches \vere. undoubtedly, apparent ,and hence the need
for irrigation water also. Incidentally, following said
Section 78-1-11, George vs. Robinson, supra, is quoted
for the proposition that deed of general warranty of
quiet and peaceable possession does not warrant water
rights unless they are appurtenant to land conveyed.
At page 11 of brief appellant says that the deed
from Sophia Andersen does not even mention a water
right, that the reason it was not mentioned was because
. grantor and grantee "no doubt knew that the water
right could not be transferred by deed'', then cites
Sec. 3-±78. Laws of Utah, 1917, which was then in force,
and at page 14 of brief points out that these same laws
were continued in force by Sec. 100-1-10, U. C. A. 1943,
and Sec. 73-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, except for the part underlined following which was added:
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed
in substantially the same manner as real estate,
except when they are represented by shares of
stock in a corporation, in which case water shall
not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land.''
This has been fully answered by what has been
said about whether or not this constitutes a rebuttable
or conclusive presumption and so will not be answered
further,
Point No. 2: The court did not err and could not
have erred in holding that the water covered by certificate of stock and the water used on the land is one
and the same identical water, or used otherwise than
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for the irrigation of said land described in the decree
because there is not even a conflict in the evidence as
to these matters; and, that the water was never by any
owner thereof either severed or intended to be severed
from the lands.
This point is intended to cover and answer appellant's point No. 2. All that part of the above, except
that underlined, has been previously answered in this
brief under point No. 1, so will not be further answered
here. However, while appellant mentioned all of the
above, in support thereof he only covers that part underlined, quotes the Deed to Water Rights, (Def's. Ex.
1) and then cites and quotes from East River Bottom
Water Company vs. Boyce, et. al., 128 Pac. 2d 277,
(Utah), (1942) and then attempts to bring the facts
in the case at bar within that decision.
An analogy will show more points of difference
than of similarity. Some of the main provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation of Mendon Central Irrigation Co. were pointed out under Point No. 1 so will
not be repeated here. The Articles certainly show that
the purpose ''is to engage exclusively in furnishing
water to and for lands owned by the stockholders
thereof (Art. 6), dividends shall consist of the distribution to the stockholders of such water as they shall
be entitled to (Art. 8), costs of repairs of maintenance
of ditches, etc., is to be assessed pro-rata against the
different classes of stock (Art. 7-B), each party covenants with all other parties to the agreement that he
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the owner of a vested primary right to the use

for irrigation purposes of a part of the waters arising
and flowing from certain springs, which he agrees to
conYey as and for payment in full for the capital stock
subscribed for by him (Art. 19), and the rights and privileges of the respective kinds and classes of stock and
the holders thereof in this corporation, are based upon
the respect,ire prior vested rights of the stockholders,
in and to the use of the waters arising and flowing
from certain spring, and in accordance with such prior
vested rights, each class of stock issued by the corporation entitles the holder to the following rights and
privileges and none other, to-wit: the holder thereof
shall have the right to the use of a stream of water
arising from named springs in accordance with a schedule prepared from time to time by the directors. (Art.
7A)
But appellant says that because a deed was executed there was a severance of the appurtenant water
rights to the corporation. First it must be again pointed out that Andrew Andersen's representation to the
corporation when he signed the articles that he was the
owner of a primary vested water right was not a fact
because title to the lands were then vested in his wife
and that therefore any stock issued to him must be
deemed to belong to his wife and that he held the same
as trustee for her in whom was vested the legal title
to the lands. Counsel seems to place a good deal of
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stress throughout the brief by repeating that there wa~
a severance by reason of the execution of the instrument entitled "Deed of Water Rights." In this regard respondent desires to say it is immaterial whether
a transfer to the corporation is made by the Deed of
Water Rights or as was done in East River Bottom
Water Co. vs. Boyce, supra, by "The signing of the
articles of agreement and the payment of the amount required ''shall constitute a transfer of all rights and
privileges of the parties to the control, management
and distribution of the water of the corporation, and
will entitle the said parties to receive stock certificates
for the amount of the interest in the corporation.'' The
point is that whatever method was used served the purpose of making the required transfer to a mutual company. And the fact that Mrs. Andersen joined in the
execution of the Deed of Water Rights cannot help
appellant. He was not a grantee. But even so, assuming him to be the rightful owner of the stock, the Articles
of Incorporation and the Deed of Water Rights must
be read in the light of the provisions of said Sections
100-1-10 and 100-1-11 (now Sees. 73-1-10 and 73-1-11,
U. C. A. 1953) and also in the light of the decision
of our court in East Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, supra.
And in this connection it must also be noted that counsel
for appellant in arriving at the conclusion he does
under Point No. 2 ignores entirely the provisions of
said Section 100-1-11 and the decisions of our court
following respecting appurtenant waters which is here-
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by specifically referred to.

So in construing the Deed
of "\Yater Rights and the Articles of Incorporation together in accordance with their agreement what did
they accomplish Y The first parties to the deed (except
the wives) are the incorporators (and Andrew Andersen could not in fact be one because he did not own
the lands and hence no primary vested water right as
called for by the articles) and so as such conveyed
to the corporation ''all of the right, title and interest
of the incorporators in and to certain spring and waters
arising in and flowing from same as described in the
the articles", etc., as and for full payment
for the capital stock subscribed by them.
And
then it may be asked, for what purpose was the conveyance made? "To engage exclusively in furnishing water
to and for lands owned by the stockholders thereof''
(Art. 6) "based upon the respective prior vested rights
of the stockholders'' the stockholders ''shall have the
right to the use" etc .. "of a stream of water" from
certain named springs according to schedule prepared
by the Board of Directors. (Art. 7-A) The only dividends they were to receive was the distribution of the
water they were entitled to under Art. 7-A. Is this
then anything but the formation of a mutual company
for any purpose other than the ''control, management
and distribution'' of the waters of the springs Y It
severed nothing because the owners of the land still
retains the use of the same water with their lands.
"It did not vest the title or right of use in the corpor-
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ation within the provisions of Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, Sees. 100-1-10 and 100-1-11 ".

The only thing

the corporation could do was to "manage, control and
distribute- the water" according to a schedule prepared
by the Board of Directors. The water right was therefore never severed from the land and is still appurtenant. And in the language used in East River Bottom
\Vater Co. vs. Boyce, supra, at page 278, right hand
column, would not ''An examination of the articles of
agreement to determine what a stock certificate represented, either for investment of loan purposes, disclose what the certificate actually represented." It,
therefore, is submitted that even without consideration
of the provisions of said Section 100-1-11, Water as
Appurtenant, which counsel completely overlooks, the
conveyance did not divest anything from the land.
Another matter, East River Bottom Water Co. vs.
Boyce, supra, involved the question of a duplicate issue
of seven shares stock which had been pledged to the
State Bank of Provo as security for a loan and the
plaintiff water company brought action to declare the
duplicate issue void and the court did so upon the theory
that the plaintiff was simply a mutual company, and not
a corporation existing for profit.
In the case at bar the facts are vastly different.
Here no third party or "outsider" has acquired any
interest. Andrew must have intended or arranged for
Quayle and Cowley to have conveyed the 17.63 acres
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to his wife, otherwise he would not have later conveyed
the 2.50 acre to her. It cannot be presumed he wanted
her to have the land and not the water with it, without
which it would be of little value. There is no evidence
over all the years on the part of any one to sever the
water from the land by sale, mortgage of the stock,
or otherwise. rrhe same water continued to be used
on the smne land as originally except that it was controlled and distributed by the irrigation company. That
it was understood by all concerned that it was considered as part of the real estate is certainly most strongly
indicated because the widow conveyed to her son L. M.
Andersen, who continued to use these same waters on
the same lands without question or interference for a
period of over 23 years until his death. Then his estate
was probated and assignments and conveyances were
made by his heirs (who are the same as those of his
father, Andrew Andersen, deceased) to Catherine Gibbons, who in turn conveyed to this plaintiff as hereinbefore stated. And that during all this period of time
there was no attempt on the part of any heir to secure
a probate of his estate, until some thirty years later
when one of the heirs initiated probate proceedings, the
only property listed being the 112 shares of water stock
involved in this case. It would seem that such a record establishes appurtenancy of the water so clearly
that it would not even be questioned. And appurtenancy
is a question of fact. It is therefore submitted that
appellant's Point No. 2 is not well taken in any view
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whatsoever, either based upon the facts of usage of
water over the years, or upon the Deed of Water
Rights, the Articles of Incorporation, the Statutes referred .to, or the decision in the East River Bottom Co.
vs. Boyce, supra, upon which appellant relies.
Point No. 3: The court plainly did not err in finding and holding that the said water stock certificate
never has been and is not now personal property separate and apart from said lands, or even so considered.
It is believed that this point has already been answered by what has been previously said under Points
1 and 2, and so the following will only answer the statements, etc., made by appellant under Point No. 3, which
it is believed requires answering. First appellant makes
the statement that it is conceded by plaintiff that the
water right is represented by a certificate of stock in
a corporaion. This statement may be admitted, but.
the admission carries with it only such rights and privileges as contended for in Point No. 2 above. Nor does
respondent admit that Andrew Anderson at the time of
his death, nor his estate, is the owner of the certificate.
Appellant has the burden in this respect. The facts
produced, respondent contends, dissipates any probative value of ownership which might arise from the signature appearing on the stub of the stock ledger. In
fact, respondent does not admit Andrew Andersen ever
was the real owner of the certificate even though issued
in his name because at the time of signing the Articles
of Incorporation he was not then the owner of a vested
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primary water right as he then represented.
Counsel next contends that the finding of the lower
court that the stock never has been and is not personal
property separate and apart from said lands is made
in the very teeth of Sec. 878, Compiled Laws of Utah
1917, (which is now 16-2-34, U. C. A. 1953) and quotes
therefrom. A reference to this section shows that it
is a part of Title 19, Chapter 1, General Incorporation.
This section deals more particularly with shares of stock
of pecuniary corporations. Following this section is
cited the case of George vs. Robinson, supra, which
has already been discussed, and in addition to what
has already been said regarding this case it is submitted that the facts and reasoning in the case hardly supports the syllabus in its entirety and that it therefore
does not hold what the syllabus would indicate. But
even so, then section quoted at the top of page 18 says
''stock shall be deemed personal property'' and the delivery of certificate together with a written transfer of
the same, signed by the owner to a bona fide purchase
or pledge for value shall be deemed a sufficient transfer of title. Appellant cannot possibly benefit any by
this provision because it has been complied ·with in no
respect at all. Appellant cannot even produce the certificate.
Counsel next states that at time of judgment Sec.
18-2-23, 1943 (which is now 16-2-34 1953 was in full force,
quotes the section and then asks, can there by any doubt
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about the stock belonging to Andrew Andersen's estate
and then says that for some unaccountable reason the
lower court refused to apply this section to the settled
facts of the case. This section is also part of the general incorporation law applicable to corporations organized for profit. See Chapter 2, Title 18, U. C. A., 1943.
A glance at this section shows that it has no application
to the facts in the case at bar. The section has two purposes: 1) For purposes of voting, receiving dividends,
levying and collecting assessments, etc., wherein the
corporation is interested the stockholder of record shall
be treated and considered the holder in fact. There
were no dividends paid except the distribution of water
which over the years went with the record owners of
the land; the record is silent as to who did the voting
at any time, and the assessments were paid always by
those who were the record owners of the land. The 1\fendon Central Irrigation Co. was therefore always satisfied. At least there is no record of any complaint
by it. 2) The transferee shall have no rights or claims
as against the corporation until transfer thereof is
made upon the books of the corporation or a new certificate is issued to him. No claim has been made by any
one against the corporation so far as the record discloses nor has a new certificate yet been issued, although
the findings and decree (Tr. 11-13) finds and directs
the said Mendon Irrigation Co. to issue another certificate to plaintiff in lieu of certificate No. 24, for the
112 shares of stock, under appropriate safeguards,
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after which this plaintiff will then be the record owner
of the certificate as well as the real owner thereof.

Coun8el next cites, quotes from, and then argues
that George vs. Robinson, supra, is controlling in the
case at bar. X othing can be added to what has already been said by respondent in regards to this case,
and the fact that it has been overruled by In re Johnson ~s estate, supra, and so no further comment will
be made. I do not notice where First National Bank
ve. Hastings, -!2 Pac. 681, (Col) is cited in George vs.
Robinson, supra, but even if so it cannot have any
weight since our court has decided the question otherwise. The issues were not at all alike. The question
there was the rights of attaching creditors of the person in whose name the stock stood and a purchaser of
the stock before issuance of new certificate. It is
therefore submitted that the stock in question could
not be personal property for any of the reason given
under appellant's Point No. 3, and that the lower court
was correct in its holding.
Point No. 4: The court was corerct in finding and
holding that Mendon Central Irrigation Co. is a mutual
company and that the interest in the water was conveyed with the land as an appurtenance.
Under this assignment appellant refers to and
quotes from East River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce
supra, and the Deed of Water Rights. Respondent
considered both of the propositions mentioned under
Point No. 1, where it seemed appropriate in view of
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the matters there mentioned in appellant's brief, and

so the discussion there made is referred to.

At page

22 of brief appellant refers to the original stock certificate book (Def's. Ex. 3), calls attention to the new certificates issued to replace surrendered original ones,
and then concludes that if the decision of the lower
court is to stand then the water rights represented
by the remaining 98 certificates issued is invalid as
well as the certificates issued after Aug. 20, 1936, and
that the certificates of every other incorporated irrigation company is also invalid. Respondent is unable to
understand the basis for this deduction. Certainly,
appellant would not take the position that the facts
behind every outstanding certificate are the same as
the facts in the case at bar. If so, then respondent
agrees with appellant's conclusion. Hut by referring
to the said stock ledger, nothing irregular is seen in
issuing new certificates in lieu of old ones. When
sales of lands were made the grantors no doubt in connection therewith endorsed and delivered the certificate,
which was entirely proper. Or as appears from stub
nos. 96, 97 and 99, the stock certificate was pledged
to the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley and Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation, no doubt in connection with a
mortgage of the land to which the water is appurtenant, and this also it would seem is proper procedure.
Certainly no one would conclude that either of these
corporations would purchase the stock as an investment.
It is therefore believed that the conclusion reached
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by appellant is unwarranted, in fact violent.
Point No. 5: The court was correct, in fact could
not have done otherwise than to hold plaintiff to be the
owner of certificate No. 24 and providing for the issuance of another one for the 112 shares of stock by the
Mendon Central Irrigation Company.
Counsel for appellant states that such a finding
constitutes an admission that the water right represented by certificate No. 24 is not appurtenant to plaintiff's
property, but is distinct and separate property. Certainly there is sufficient in the findings to indicate
otherwise. Respondent is unable to perceive the basis
for any such deduction and shall therefore not pursue
this statement any further. Counsel next at page 23
of brief cites and quotes again from George vs. Robinson, supra. This case has been discussed by respondent previously and so shall not duplicate what
has already been said as to what this case holds and
stands for. Counsel for respondent believes the only
answer to be made to appellants' criticism of the quoted
portion of the lower court's decree given at page 24
of brief is that the facts under the law justify and support the court's decree abundantly. It is impossible for
appellant to see how an allegation in a complaint, followed by the court's finding, which described the property the subject of the law suit, and found by the court
to be the property of the plaintiff, can be construed
to mean that such property belongs to the estate of
Andrew Andersen, deceased. Appellant has previously
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discussed the facts and the chain of title referred to

h~~

appellant at page 25 of brief and so believes there is
nothing further to be said in regards thereto.

Counsel

next conjectures that the heirs of Andrew Andersen did
not ask for a probate because possession of the property was in his widow and children, although any one
of them could have sought a probate at any time. Whatever, excuse might be assigned by counsel of appellant
for the delay, respondent believes and the lower court
seen1s to have believed and therefore found otherwise
and such holding is supported both in the facts and
certainly in equity.
Point No. 6: Finding No. 4 is properly included in
the findings and is supported by equitable consideration.
At page 26 of brief counsel relates the sustaining
of an objection, that counsel for respondent conceded that his offer was upon the theory that he believed
the water right represented by the certificate of stock
was appurtnant to the land, that the court apparently
did no agreed with this contention, but that nevertheless
fourteen months later when the court rendered it decision paragraph four of plaintiff's complaint was included in the findings of the court. It is believed
that there would be no useful purpose accomplished
by attempting to argue this matter. It involves what
a court does in "making up its mind" or "in rendering its decree". Suffice it to say, however, that the
same objectionable matter which is complained about
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appears in Pis. Ex. A, the abstract at pages 31-34, in-

clusive, to the admission of which no objection was
raised.

Furthermore, respondent submits that the De-

cree, following as it does the other conveyances and
assignments made by the heirs of L. M. Andersen, Deceased, who are the same as the heirs of Andrew Andersen, Deceased, does have a bearing in equity in this
case. It is believed that the remainder of the matters
mentioned and discussed under appellant's Point No. 4
have heretofore been discussed and treated or do not
require answer.
Point No. 7: The court's holding quieting title in
the plaintiff, etc., is supported in equity, and is entitled
to be sustained by this court.
By this point resondent intends to cover the matters not already treated in this brief and mentioned
under appellant's Point No. 7: Counsels complains that
there is no allegation or finding that plaintiff purchased this stock.

Inferentially it appears that the water

was paid for in connection with the various conveyances
and assignments made, some of which even specifically
included appurtenant water rights as hereinbefore stated.

Rarely is a separate price put on water; it goes

with the land. This is common knowledge. But the
complete answer to such statement is that the decision
of the court is supported by the facts proven, the statutes
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referred to and: the decisions of our court. · No such find-

ings that the stock as such was . purchased is therefore
.

necessary.

Counsel next says the holding is contrary

to ~nyder vs. Murdock,

50 Pac. 9, (Utah) (1899) and

George vs~ .Robison, supra.

Both of these cases were

overruled by the decision in In re Johnson's estate and
so no useful purpose would be accomplished by discussing the Snyder case.

Suffice it to say the facts are

entirely different from those in the case at bar. Contrary to appellant's statement it is submitted that there
is absoluely no testimony in the record to the effect
that a majority of the heirs of the estate of Andrew Andersen, deceased, permitted certain of the other heirs to
use the water. Nor is there a single scintilla of evidence
that the use was premissive. It is believed that the balanc of the statements made in the brief to the affect that
the lower court's decision amounts to confiscation of
property forbidden by the constitution, that title can
only be acquired through a probate sale, that quiet tile
action can only be maintained by person having title,
and that he must prevail on the strength of his own
title and not on the strength of his adversary's, is so
obviously inapplicable to the facts in this case as to
require no answer.
Respondent having fully answered appellant's brief
it is submitted that the lower court's Decree is supported both in law and the facts and entitled in equity
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to be affirmed by this court, together with respondent's
costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,
George C. Heinrich
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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